Governments are investing billions of dollars in low-carbon energy technologies in order to address climate change. Recently governments have also adopted protectionist measures in low-carbon energy technology sectors. In the solar photovoltaic industry, governments in both Europe and the United States responded to a rise in Chinese module exports through the imposition of tariffs, voluntary export restraints and other measures. The government in Japan, however -another major solar market -has not done so. We hypothesize that the position of firms in global value chains shape their preferences vis-à-vis trade protection. Our findings show the policy positions of the majority of firms align with expectations. In doing so we provide evidence that industry specialization shapes firm demand for trade protection in a major green industry. More generally, our research suggests the globalization and fragmentation of supply chains creates important trade-offs for governments by pitting industrial interests against upstream and downstream firms and environmental interests seeking to maximize market penetration of renewable technologies.
Introduction
Governments in the advanced industrialized states face two challenges: how to respond economically to the rise of China, and how to mitigate the risk of catastrophic climate change.
2 These challenges converge through green industrial policy-the attempt by governments in the advanced industrialized states to promote domestic renewable energy industries in order to create jobs, and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).
The rise of China in renewable energy manufacturing challenges this effort, however.
Renewable energy manufacturers in Europe and the United States (US) in particular have
been suffering from Chinese import competition, and in response, an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral trade disputes have been initiated in renewable energy industries since 2010, with most of these involving China as respondent or complainant. In this paper we test a number of hypotheses related to changes in the global 1 Authors contributed equally to this paper. Jonas Meckling is Assistant Professor, Dept. of 4 organization of production using data drawn from the global solar photovoltaic industry.
We selected the solar photovoltaic industry for two reasons. First, the solar photovoltaic is the fastest-growing renewable energy segment in terms of investment, and is thus a key industry for global de-carbonization efforts. 4 Second, our goal is to examine the effect of globalization and specialization on trade preferences of firms, and the solar photovoltaic sector is a highly globalized and vertically specialized. It is an appropriate case to examine how these changes affect the trade preferences of firms.
We argue the identified variation in firms' responses to the rise in Chinese solar exports can be explained by the effects of intra-industry fragmentation on the preferences of firms towards rising Chinese solar imports. In particular, we argue that the rise of vertical specialization -defined as when a good is produced in multiple, sequential stages, and when firms specialize in one, some, but not all, stages of the value-chain -introduced greater diversity in the characteristics of firms operating within the solar industry in countries experiencing rising imports from China. This led, we argue, to a less unified industry response to Chinese import penetration.
Our findings are significant for policy and theory. Efforts to mitigate climate change by supporting green industries matter for international competitiveness. Yet the implications of vertical specialization for the demands for trade protectionism in climaterelated industries remain understudied. We suggest that vertical specialization matters because it fragments industry lobbying coalitions responding to rapid increases in imports. For governments, intra-industry conflict within green industries thus creates new trade-offs between the protection of segments of domestic industries and the promotion of global trade in low-carbon energy technologies that can help mitigate climate change.
Theoretically, studies of the politics of trade protection often assume firms' policy preferences are homogeneous within single industries, or they distinguish between domestic firms and those that also have invested in production facilities located outside the domestic economy. Yet there are also important differences in the degree to which firms choose to outsource production, with implications for their preferences over a range of trade policy outcomes. We introduce data showing intra-industry firm heterogeneity extends to important climate related industries, and that these differences between firms has important implications for their non-market strategies, most notably the positions firms adopted towards the initiation of trade disputes in an important new area of state activity: government policies designed to mitigate the risk of catastrophic climate change.
We proceed in five sections. In the next section we describe changes in patterns of global solar photovoltaic production over the last decade, and describe our outcome variable, which focuses on the policy preferences of firms towards the rise in Chinese solar exports. In section three we develop a series of expectations for trade responses of firms operating in the solar photovoltaic industry. Thereafter, we lay out the methods and standards applied to data collection in section four. We then examine the validity of these hypotheses by segment-i.e., upstream, manufacturing, and downstream firms-in section five. In the fifth section we examine the outliers and engage with alternative explanations. In the sixth and final section we discuss the implications of our findings for the politics of protection in climate change. 
Globalization and Vertical Specialization in the Photovoltaic Industry
Renewable energy has emerged as a major sector in the global energy industry. In There was also a transformative change in the geography of production. The solar value chain can be divided into a number of segments, beginning with the manufacture of raw materials using machine tools, moving through wafer, cell, and module manufacturing, and finishing with system integration and project development (Table   Two) . 14 In the early phase of the solar industry all segments of the value chain tended to be located in the same country or region, and were owned by vertically-integrated firms.
Over time, however, firms shifted manufacturing facilities internationally. Firms also concentrated operations in a limited number of segments of the solar supply chain, rather than integrating vertically through the entire PV supply chain. 
Explaining Variation in Firm Trade Preferences
The increase in module manufacturing in China induced a fall in firm profitability: 24 US manufacturers chose to exit the market by the end of 2012, with 10
European and 50 Chinese manufacturers doing so in 2012. 19 Other firms chose a different strategy, integrating non-market responses -focused on lobbying policymakers to protect against rising Chinese module imports -with market-based responses such as concentrating on market segments less penetrated by Chinese imports. 20 Firms, and the industry groups that represent them, thus faced a choice of lobbying government in favor of, or against, measures designed to protect against rising Chinese PV production, or taking no action.
The decision by some firms to lobby for import protection matches expectations from sectoral trade theory. 21 Under general conditions introducing barriers to trade changes the relative price of tradable goods and services, affecting the real income of different actors. When factors of production are immobile, and the expected benefits of the price change are greater than the threshold required for collective action, then we expect firms to mobilize politically. If the benefits do not meet this threshold, on the other hand, then we do not expect them to lobby in favor of the policy.
While the effects of changes in the composition of trade on trade preferences have 16 European Photovoltaic Industry Association 2013. 17 In 2012, the top 15 global PV module producers accounted for half of the 35.5 GW capacity installed that year. Yingli (China) was the largest producer, followed by Suntech (China) and First Solar (USA). REN21 2014. 18 Kirkegaard, Hanemann, Weischer and Miller 2010. 19 Mehta 2013. 20 On integrated strategy see Baron 1997 . 21 Milner 1999. been examined to date, the effects of vertical specialization are less well studied. 22 In general terms, if the distributive effects of a policy on firms operating in a sector are uniform, then we expect it to have unified trade policy preferences. In the solar photovoltaic industry, for example, the introduction of a feed-in tariff (FIT) led to an increase in demand, suggesting the industry will unite in support of this kind of policy instrument. If policy instruments have different distributive effects on firms, on the other hand, then we expect variation in policy preferences. An import tariff, for example, affects import competing firms within a sector differently to those that produce internationally. This should lead them to adopt different positions towards the tariff.
In this paper we focus on the effects of the globalization of production, and vertical specialization, on the lobbying behavior of firms. We propose that the rise of Chinese module production had markedly different distributive effects on firms, depending on a firm's position in global supply chains. Two aspects of a firm's position were particularly important in determining the ability of firms to benefit from the rise in Chinese manufacturing, and thus the policy position they adopted towards trade barriers:
(i) the extent of ties to firms in the trading partner country, and; (ii) the stage of the supply chain in which the firm specializes.
Theoretical and empirical evidence support the first of these contentions. 23 The rise in multinational production and intra-firm trade is recognized to have reduced the demand among firms for protection because of factors such as the increased costs of trade barriers for firms that produce internationally, and concern about retaliation. as a counterweight to domestically-based import-competing producers that are more likely to support protection. 26 In addition, however, we propose that upstream firms are also likely to oppose protectionist measures, because a rise in manufacturing internationally represents a secular increase in demand for products they produce, and thus an increase in profits in the short to medium-run assuming some barriers to market to entry.
Taken together, we are thus left with a change in the composition of lobbying coalitions as a result of the globalization of production and increase in vertical specialization. Domestic import-competing manufacturers are left isolated against globalized manufacturers, domestic downstream firms, as well as domestic upstream firms.
We apply this logic to the solar photovoltaic industry below. The rise in Chinese module manufacturing represented a secular rise in productive capacity in the manufacturing segment of the solar photovoltaic supply chain. We argue that this change in the distribution of production had distinct distributive implications for firms operating in the upstream, in manufacturing, and in the downstream segments of the industry.
Upstream Segment
For vertically specialized firms that operated in the upstream -either by producing raw material or tools used to manufacture and test modules -the rise in
Chinese manufacturing was not a competitive threat. Instead, the rise in Chinese module manufacturing represented an increase in demand for their products. This should be the case when they have direct ties to China such as sales contracts. But it also applies to firms that do not have long-standing sales relationships with Chinese firms. For polysilicon producers producing the raw materials used in solar wafer production, aggregate global demand shapes prices given that they operate in commodity markets.
Additional demand from China thus drives prices up, which is favorable to them. Firms manufacturing machine tools, testing and measuring equipment used in module manufacturing produce products that are less commoditized than polysilicon. Their equipment is not specific to particular module manufacturers, however, meaning the 26 Gawande, Hoekman and Cui 2014: 8. option of selling to Chinese customers is similarly likely to lead to an increase in demand for their products.
Because of this, in both cases we should expect firms specialized in the manufacture of these products to gain from an increase in module manufacturing capacity in China. Accordingly, they should oppose any attempts to impose barriers to imports that may harm the competitiveness of these new market entrants, regardless of whether they have existing contracts with firms based in China (hypothesis 1).
We expect firms to adopt this position for a second reason. Even if the rise in China's module production leads firms based in China to take market share away from domestic module production, the imposition of import barriers is likely to reduce domestic demand for solar power relative to alternative sources of electricity generation.
This means that even if imports are substituted for domestic producers, aggregate demand for upstream products are expected to fall. Firms that are vertically specialized in the production of machine tools, or polysilicon, should thus be expected to oppose the imposition of import barriers.
Manufacturing Segment
For firms operating in the manufacture of modules, on the other hand, we expect heterogeneity in firm preferences. Most obviously, module manufacturers firms that do not have ties to manufacturing in China should have the most intense preferences in favor of import protection. Solar modules are an undifferentiated product. This makes Chinese module producers direct competitors for these firms. Import protection increases the cost of imports relative to domestic modules, leading us to expect these firms will support protection (hypothesis 2). We expect firms that are integrated over wafer, cell and module production, and those that specialize in module production alone, to take this position.
We do not expect all module manufacturers to support the imposition of barriers to imports. Instead, two types of firm characteristics should lead manufacturers to oppose the imposition of barriers to imports (hypothesis 3). First, firms that have globalized module production through owning module production in China should oppose protection, given that their products will lose competitiveness relative to domestic producers through the imposition of import barriers. Second, we expect that even in the absence of direct ties such as the direct ownership of module production facilities in China, vertically specialized module manufacturers have an incentive to oppose import barriers when they have less direct ties, in the form of supply contracts for cells, wafers, or modules. If a specialized module producer buys cells from China, for example, trade barriers would increase the cost of those supplies, reducing the competitiveness of their products. Similarly, if a module producer supplies meets part of its demand through production outsourced to an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM, or Original Design
Manufacturer (ODM) (Sturgeon 2001 ), then we expect them to oppose the imposition of barriers to imports given that it will reduce their competitiveness relative to purely domestic module manufacturers, as well as reducing the competitiveness of solar power compared to alternative sources of electricity supply.
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Downstream Segment
The effect of the expected costs of import protection for vertically specialized upstream producers is mirrored in our expectations for downstream firms involved in project development and the installation of solar photovoltaic systems. Most obviously, firms that have ties to China through supply contracts with Chinese module manufacturers are affected negatively by import barriers as it increases their costs of inputs. We also expect, however, that downstream firms that purchase from non-Chinese module manufacturers are incentivized to oppose trade barriers; solar modules are largely commoditized, meaning additional supply from Chinese producers to third markets reduces the price of modules, which is positive for developers and installers that do not directly supply from China. In this case, firms have an incentive to oppose trade barriers because of the expected impact of trade barriers on the cost of inputs (hypothesis 4). We thus expect firms that are vertically specialized and operating in the upstream and downstream segments of the market to have unified preferences in opposition to the imposition of trade barriers, for the reasons outlined above. 27 The intensity of preferences for vertically integrated firms should be weaker than vertically specialized firms that are in direct competition with PV module manufacturers with a presence in China, because the losses of the division producing modules should be balanced against the fall in input prices for downstream divisions within the firm that benefit from falling module prices. Lack of data on preference intensity makes it impossible to test this against data, however.
Summary
Considering the extent of global ties (domestic vs. globalized) and the level of specialization (upstream-manufacturing-downstream), from the above we can state four hypotheses regarding firms' expected positions towards restraining imports from China. These are summarized, and in To summarize, we propose there is an association between the nature of firm ties with the trading partner, and the form of vertical specialization, and the position firms adopt towards import barriers. Firms that are vertically specialized in module manufacturing and purely domestic should have policy preferences in favor of protection.
H4: Downstream firms manufacturers should oppose the imposition of trade barriers, regardless of whether they have ties to solar PV production in China
Firms with production located in China should oppose the imposition of trade barriers, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated or specialized. Vertically specialized increase greater heterogeneity in intra-industry firm preferences, depending on whether firms are in a position to take advantage of the globalization and vertical specialization in production. Industry lobbying coalitions are thus fragmented in responding to rapid increases in imports.
Empirical Section
Why did firms within the PV industry adopt different strategies towards the extraordinarily rapid increase in Chinese module imports? We expect the positions firms took towards the imposition of a tariff differed systematically according on their characteristics. In this section we examine the characteristics of firms and their policy preferences for each of the market segments that make up the photovoltaic supply chain:
the upstream, manufacturing, and the downstream, for the European, U.S. and Japanese markets. We then summarize how well our empirical model explains the positions adopted by firms towards the rise in Chinese photovoltaic module manufacturing.
Data and Methods
We focus on three major photovoltaic markets: Europe, the United States, and Japan. In addition to being important PV markets globally, each experienced a substantial increase in imports from China. This makes them appropriate as comparable cases when examining how firm structure affects trade preferences in the global PV market.
It is also noteworthy that governments in each of these regions/countries adopted different approaches to the rise in production from China. In the European Union a price floor was established on solar panels in 2012, along with voluntary export restraints (VERs). The agreement established a price floor of 56 cents per watt, with a total annual import limit of 2,000 GW. In the United States the Department of Commerce published a notice in October 2012 setting forth the final determination in its countervailing subsidy and anti-dumping investigation, with tariffs ranging from 24 to 36 percent. An important contrast is Japan, where there has been no policy response.
Our hypotheses focus on the effects of differences in firm characteristics in the global PV market on the preferences of these firms towards the imposition of barriers to imports of Chinese PV modules. Two kinds of data are used to assess the hypotheses empirically.
The first is the type of firms' vertical specialization, and the degree of globalization, which here refers to ties to solar PV production in China. To identify relevant firms and code their characteristics we used membership lists from the major industry associations headquartered in each country or region. We used a global database of PV manufacturers, supplemented with corporate websites, to identify the module production capacity of the firms, and the stages of the supply chain they participated in, from silicon, equipment to wafers, cells, modules, and systems integration/project development. We also coded whether the firms had ties to Chinese PV production. We considered ties in the form of sales to China, supply purchases from China, production facilities in China, and Chinese ownership. 28 The presence of any of these links was coded as the existence of such ties. 29 In table 3, we refer to firms that have any of the above ties as 'globalized,' whereas we code firms that do not have any such ties to China as 'domestic.' We also used a global database of PV manufacturers to ensure large firms were included in the analysis. 30 For upstream and downstream segments, we sampled firms drawn from the ad-hoc industry associations' member lists to identify the characteristics of firm members.
The second type of data is the trade preferences of firms. We used three sources of data to hand-code firms' trade preferences. First, we used primary documents in which firms state a position towards the use of barriers to trade against China imports. Second, we used member lists from associations in each market, coupled with formal statements by those associations, assuming members agree to the position taken by the association of which they are members. Third, we conducted interviews -summarized in the appendix -with market participants in the European, US, and Japanese markets. We carried out a 28 All types of global ties discussed above could theoretically occur within one multinational firm. 29 The data used in the analysis are included for reviewers. 30 These firms were included under the assumption that larger firms are likely to be more influential politically A justification for this assumption is that PV manufacturing exhibits economies of scale. Larger firms are thus more likely to have higher net revenues, enabling them to allocate greater funds to political activities such as lobbying. A total of 64 manufacturers were coded across the three markets. Firm Preference Indicator Support Protection 1) Written documentation of support for increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China, including press releases (selfreporting) and articles in major newspapers or industry magazines (third-party reporting). 2) Statement of support for increasing trader barriers against rise in PV imports from China by firm or industry association representative in on-the-record interview. 3) Two independent third-party interview statements that a firm supported increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China. 4) Membership of industry organization that adopts position in support of increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China Oppose Protection 1) Written documentation of opposition to increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China, including press releases (selfreporting) and articles in major newspapers or industry magazines (third-party reporting). 2) Statement of opposition increasing trader barriers against rise in PV imports from China by firm or industry association representative in on-the-record interview. 3) Two independent third-party interview statements that a firm opposed increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China. 4) Membership of industry organization that adopts position against increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China. Indifferent 1) Explicit statement of neutrality towards increasing trade barriers against rise in PV imports from China.
Upstream Segment -Firm Preferences and Characteristics
In this section we assess hypothesis one, which focused on the upstream segment.
This segment of the market is made up of polysilicon producers and the manufacturers of machine tools. As noted above, we expect firms operating in this segment of the market to oppose the imposition of trade barriers, regardless of whether they have ties to solar photovoltaic module production in China.
The evidence is consistent with expectations. The Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) -the global industry body of manufacturers in the microand nano-electronic industries has firm membership across the U.S., European, and Japanese markets. SEMI represented the interests of toolmakers and polysilicon producers globally, and identifies 170 members to belong to the solar equipment industry.
A sample of 124 firm members of SEMI found all but seven firms manufactured some kind of production equipment for the solar wafer, cell and module industry, implying the organization represented the interests of upstream suppliers of solar equipment. The European Commission examined a sample of eight upstream producers in Europe, finding that on average firms sold 20 percent of their solar-related products to the EU, 50 33 The position in the supply chain was unclear for four firms from the sample. When extrapolated to the entire population, this suggests that 170 member firms were engaged in peripheral equipment manufacturing. 34 40 In Japan, the major Japanese producer Tokuyama produced silicon in China in addition to Japan and Malaysia, and shifted productive capacity from Japan to China. 41 Given the lack of support for manufacturers for trade protection, as described below, they were not required to state their opposition to trade protectionism. Although weaker evidence, the absence of evidence that it pushed for protection is consistent with expectations given the focus of the firm on the upstream segment of the solar supply chain.
Manufacturing Segment -Firm Characteristics and Preferences
In this section we assess hypotheses two and three, which focus on the manufacturing segment of the solar supply chain. Our expectations are that module manufacturers without China ties should support the imposition of trade barriers, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated or specialized. We expect this to be balanced against manufacturers with China ties, who are more likely to be in a lobbying coalition in opposition to the imposition of trade barriers, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated or specialized. There were thus only a small subset of firms that were both located in Japan and that were directly competing with Chinese manufacturers, giving them preferences towards implementing trade barriers against Chinese imports. If we take into account market share, then only three of the photovoltaic manufacturers identified as firms with significant market share in Japan are focused on the photovoltaic market alone, with the rest diversified.
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It is thus unsurprising that there was no pressure to implement barriers to trade in the case of Japan, in contrast to both the United States and Europe. 57 The Japanese government did not record any demands from firms or industry to push for protection from the rise in imports. 58 Interviews with manufacturing firms also suggested they did not support protectionism. 59 Examining the record of all press conferences between regulatory competence over many energy-related laws, and who heads the ministry responsible for designing and implementing Japan's renewables policy, also shows no evidence of ministerial concern about rising imports from China.
Downstream Segment -Firm Preferences and Characteristics
In this section we assess the evidence regarding hypothesis four. In common with upstream firms, we expect downstream firms to oppose the imposition of trade barriers regardless of whether they have ties to solar PV production in China. Firms with ties to
China through supply contracts with Chinese module manufacturers would thus be affected negatively by trade barriers. In addition given that solar modules are largely undifferentiated, additional supply from Chinese producers reduces the price of modules which increases profits for developers and installers even if they do not directly supply from China. Indeed, the fact that US imports of Chinese PV solar modules amounted to $2.65 billion reflects that US project developers and installers draw on Chinese supplies to a considerable extent.
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The data is largely consistent with expectations, although the preferences of some firms do not match expectations. 61 The downstream segment of the industry-project developers and installers-are predominantly non-integrated firms. 
Summary of Evidence
The evidence introduced shows there were cleavages within the solar industry with regard to whether to lobby for or against the imposition of trade barriers against Chinese module exports. Evidence also shows these divisions within the solar industry were largely consistent with expectations. Taken together, a lobbying coalition of upstream polysilicon and equipment manufacturers, along with the majority of downstream project developers and installers, opposed trade measures. In contrast, in
Europe and the United States module manufacturers were divided, with some supporting, and some opposing, the imposition of trade barriers. This division among manufacturers was also consistent with expectations, with domestically focused firms lacking ties with China supporting protection, and those with some form of ties with China opposing.
Finally, data on the characteristics of manufacturers in Japan shows the firms enjoying significant market share retained supply relations with China, or located manufacturing facilities there. It is thus unsurprising these firms did not lobby for protectionist measures, in contrast to a number of US and European firms.
How did our model of trade expectations perform? In the upstream segment, the ad-hoc industry associations that represented the interests of 233 firms adopted the expected position, opposing the imposition of tariffs. There is no direct record of the trade preferences of Japanese firms operating in the upstream segment with regard to the Japanese market. This is unsurprising given the characteristics of module manufacturers headquartered in Japan. It is also consistent with expectations: the major source of protectionist sentiment in Europe and the United States -domestic module producers that lacked ties with China -was absent in the case of Japan. Data from Japanese firms operating in the US market which were members of an industry organization opposing the imposition of trade barriers in the US market, is consistent with expectations.
In the manufacturing segment of the PV supply chain, of 32 manufacturers examined -both vertically specialized and vertically integrated -the preferences of 21 of the firms matched expectations. In the Japanese case there was no attempt to pursue Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate number of firms not meeting expectations. Total number of firm observations lower than in attached datasheet because of exclusion of firms for which no data is available, and research institutes and other organizations that do not gain or lose from the imposition of import barriers. See appendix for calculation. 
Extent of Ties with Trading Partner Domestic Globalized
Segment of Specialization
Explaining Outliers
The evidence introduced above demonstrates the data are consistent with our explanation for variation in firm preferences towards rising Chinese solar module imports, although the data also shows a number of firms behaved in ways inconsistent with expectations. In this section we summarize three potential explanations for why some firms did not behave according to expectations. We did so by analyzing the data using inductive methods, recognized as useful for developing new explanations for outcomes that do not meet expectations derived from existing theory. 72 Doing so offers three potential explanations for why firms did not behave according to expectations:
industry dynamics, horizontal diversification, and economic nationalism.
Examining the characteristics of manufacturing firms that behaved contrary to expectations offers the first potential explanation for this outcome: five of the firms that remained neutral despite being domestic manufacturers in direct competition with Chinese exporters were in the process of takeover by a foreign firm. suggesting horizontal diversification is a characteristic common to firms that adopt market and non-market strategies that are inconsistent with expectations.
A second form of horizontal integration also may have affected firm preferences. more open trade.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined what explains differences in firm responses to a common economic shock: the rapid rise in Chinese photovoltaic module exports that began in the 2000s. We presented evidence that firms within the PV industry responded quite differently to this rise. We proposed that an important part of explaining this difference in responses lies in variation in firm characteristics across two dimensions: the type of vertical specialization, and the extent to which they are linked into supply chains that incorporate Chinese cell or module production.
We found substantial support for these hypotheses. Across the three major nonChinese PV markets we found firms opposed or supported the imposition of trade barriers systematically depending on whether they were tied into global supply chains that incorporated China. Module manufacturers that are not integrated into global supply chains, on the other hand, overwhelmingly supported the imposition of trade barriers.
We also found that a smaller number of firms did not match expectations. Further investigation suggests a number of possible reasons for this. First, firms that were seeking outside investment, or were in the process of being taken over tended to remain neutral.
Second, a number of firms that are diversified horizontally also appear to have made choices to leave the PV market, or not to respond politically. This can be explained by the different stakes that appear to exist for diversified firms for which solar is one of a number of businesses. When photovoltaics are a business unit within a firm that is diversified horizontally, exiting the market does not represent an existential threat, but is rather is a reallocation of capital to other parts of the business. we consider policy outcomes, however, the degree of unanimity or division does not appear to be a perfect predictor of outcomes. In the Japanese case firms certainly were uniformly opposed to import barriers. In the US and European cases, on the other hand, we found more (the United States), and less (Europe) stringent import barriers erected despite intra-industry divisions. Indeed, industry divisions may have ironically enabled political entrepreneurs in the European Commission to act more freely in deciding when and how to respond to the rise in Chinese module imports.
Appendix 1: Data Collection
This appendix offers additional information on the methods used for data collection and analysis.
a. Measuring the Dependent Variable (trade preferences)
The unit of analysis is the individual firm, however we also use the preference of intra-industry associations as a proxy for the preferences of individual members. We do so based on the following assumptions.
-Ad hoc alliances (AFASE, CASE, CASM, EU ProSun): The four ad hoc alliances are special-purpose associations formed around a specific policy position-either in support or in opposition of trade protection. We thus assume that all members joined the group as a result of their individual trade preferences. -Trade associations (SEMI, VDMA): We assume that the formulation of lobby positions within the associations is based either on majority or consensus rule. If consensus applies, member preferences equal association preference. If the majority rule applies, some member firms may still have different preferences. If those preferences are strong, we would assume that the firm join one of the ad hoc alliances in addition to its trade association membership. In that case, we would take membership in the ad hoc alliance as an indicator for the firm's preference.
b. Interviews Sampling
We conducted 30 interviews with high-level industry executives and analysts. Interviewees were selected based on two methods. First, we employed snowball sampling to identify interviewees to discuss the general dynamics of the case. We first identified key actors involved in the main trade associations and ad hoc alliances through websites and major newspaper articles. We then asked those interviewees for referrals to other key actors. We made sure to interview representatives of each party in the dispute. However, the distribution of interviewees across the three positions-neutral, support, oppose-is not equal, as those that we could identify to support trade measures were less likely to agree to an interview than those who opposed trade measures. Second, we identified interviewees based on information need to establish trade preferences. If written documentation of a trade preference was unavailable, we contacted the firm directly. We identified the spokesperson or a senior executive through web research.
Questions
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way. The questions were somewhat tailored to the specific home market of the firm (EU, Japan, US). The following questions were at the core of the interviews: 
Confidentiality rules
Confidentiality rules were discussed with each interviewee individually before the interview. The interviews are based on -For background only: The formation cannot be used in writing. It only provided cues for who to interview and what to examine. -Off the record: The information can be used, but not attributed. -Attribution by role: The information can be used and attributed to the interviewee by her/his professional function as specified by the interviewee. -Attribution by name: The information can be used and attributed to the interviewee by name. (Table 5 ) Table 5 reports the total number of firms in each segment, and the number of firms in each segment that did not meet expectations. The following procedure was used to calculate outcomes.
c. Calculation of Outcomes
1. First, all firms in the population were categorized by segment. In addition, firms operating in the manufacturing segment were categorized by ties with trading partner. Note that a number of region-specific industry associations had mixed membership. We therefore allocated using this procedure. Sources of data used to identify firms in the population are identified in the body of the paper.
2. Second, we coded the preferences of firms, and identified whether they confirmed, or did not confirm, with expectations. Sources of data for preferences for firms are identified in the attached data for reviewers file. Firms with no data, and organization members (such as organizations specializing in basic R&D, or research institutes) for which the policy had little distributive implications, were excluded from the final firm count included in Table 5 .
3. For organizations with large memberships, firms were randomly sampled using sampling procedure for categorical data. (This is relevant in the upstream and downstream segments only). Sampled firms are identified in the attached data for reviewers file. In Table 5 we report the results for the mean number of firms of each type within the organization, and the mean number of firms matching (or not matching) expectations for the whole population. Range of total number of firms operating in upstream segment is 395-415 firms. Range of total number of firms operating in downstream segment is 609-639 firms.
4. Coding rules for preference outcomes in the Japan market differed from that for the European and US markets, given that no market participant brought a formal case to government. Interview data from the industry association, and from the government, confirmed there had been no demand for protection from firms. For manufacturing and downstream firms this interpretation is consistent with interview data with firm representatives. Given the position of the industry association, we coded member firms as opposed to the imposition of trade protection.
We believe this is the most appropriate strategy for interpreting this evidence. It is also possible to recode outcomes excluding firm observations from the Japan market that lack a direct statement for or against the possibility of the imposition of import barriers.(Individual interviews with manufacturers yielded this information.) Recalculating using this coding method reduces the total number of firm observations, as follows. It does not substantially change the number of firms that did not match expectations. 
